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MORADI-SHALAL v. FIREMAN'S FUND 
INSURANCE COMPANIES: 
THE OVERRULING OF ROYAL GLOBE 
AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies l 
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident when her auto-
mobile was negligently struck by the insured. Plaintiff filed suit 
against the insured for her personal injuries and subsequently 
made settlement offers to the insured. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Companies, the insurance company for the insured, did not 
reply to plaintiff's settlement offers. Ultimately, plaintiff settled 
. with the insured for an amount that was substantially less than 
the original settlement offer she had submitted to Fireman's. 
Since plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract be-
tween the insured and the insurer, she filed a third party action 
against Fireman's pursuant to Royal Globe Insurance Company 
v. Superior Court of Butte County.2 In 1979, Royal Globe held 
that California Insurance Code Section 790.03(h)3 provided third 
1. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988). 
2. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). 
3. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1990): 
§ 790.03(h) prohibits the following: 
(h) knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general 
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: 
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relat-
ing to any coverages at issue. 
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies. 
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investiga-
tion and processing. of claims arising under insurance policies. 
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof 
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured. 
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. 
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an in-
surance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in 
345 
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party claimants with an implied right of action against insurers 
that commit unfair or deceptive practices." This decision served 
as the basis for third party bad faith claims against the insurer. 
In 1988, Moradi-Shalal overruled Royal Globe and held 
that Insurance Code Section 790.03(h) did not create a private 
cause of action for a third party claimant against an insurer.G 
The court also held that a final judicial determination of liability 
must be rendered against the insured before the insurer could be 
held liable to third party claims.6 This Note will analyze the rea-
soning utilized by the Moradi-Shalal court in overruling Royal 
Globe and also analyze its concomitant effects upon the rights of 
third party claimants.? Third party claimants' alternatives to a 
actions brought by the insureds, when the insureds have made claims for amounts rea-
sonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered. 
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a 
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed 
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application. ' 
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered 
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or 
broker. 
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon re-
quest by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made. 
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing 
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling 
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration. 
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claim-
ant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring 
the subsequent submission of formal proof of lOBS forms, both of which submissions con-
tain substantially the same information. 
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under 
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under 
other portions of the insurance policy coverage. 
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in 
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or 
for the offer of a compromise settlement. 
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney. 
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations. 
(16) Delaying the payment or provision of hospital, medical, or surgical benefits for 
services provided with respect to acquired immune deficiency syndrome or AIDS-related 
complex for more than 60 days after the insurer has received a claim for those benefits, 
where the delay in claim payment is for the purpose of investigating whether the condi-
tion pre-existed the coverage. However, this 60-day period shall not include any time 
during which the insurer is awaiting a response for relevant medical information from a 
health care provider. 
4. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. 
5. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126. 
6. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
7. This Note shall not review California's bad faith law governing the insurance in-
2
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Royal" Globe action will then be considered, such as third party 
actions by assignment from the insured, and third party private 
causes of action against insurers pursuant to California Business 
& Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.8 
II. MORADI-SHALAL v. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. COS.· 
Before Royal Globe, third party claimants could not sue in-
surers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.9 In Royal Globe, the California Supreme Court decided 
that a claimant could sue· an insurer for violations of the Uni-
form Practices Act (UP A) .10 
In Royal Globe the plaintiff filed an action for personal in-
juries against the defendant's insurer after a slip-and-fall acci-
dent, alleging two violations of Insurance Code Section 790.03.11 
The first violation alleged that Royal Globe Insurance Company 
did not attempt to settle in good faith with the injured plain-
tiff.12 The second allegation was that Royal Globe's adjuster had 
advised the plaintiff not to consult an attorney.lS Royal Globe 
demurred on three grounds.H It argued that the Insurance Com-
missioner was the sole authority to enforce the UP A; that plain-
tiff was a third party and therefore lacked standing to sue the 
dustry prior to Moradi-Shalal. This topic has already been summarized. See Lippert, 
Loosing the Fox Amongst the Chickens: The California Supreme Court Ouerrules Royal 
Globe in Moradi-Shalal u. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 22 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1267 (1989); 
Gainer, The Ouerruling of Royal Globe: A "Royal Bonanza" for Insurance Companies, 
But What Happens Now?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989); Price, Royal Globe Ins. Co. 
u. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit against an Insurer by a Third-Party Claimant, 
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161 (1980). 
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 is also known as the "Unfair Competition 
Statute". 
9. Murphy u. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588, 132 Cal. 
Rptr. 424, 428 (1976). 
10. California codified the UPA. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & 
Supp. 1990). 
11. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 331-32, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45; 
plaintiff alleged that defendant Royal Globe Insurance Company had violated subdivi-
sion (h)(5) of the act "in that it refused 'to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, 
fair and equitable settlement' of plaintiff's claim although 'liability ... [had] become 
reasonably clear,' " and its agent had advised plaintiff not to obtain the services of an 
attorney, in violation of subdivision (h)(14). Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; See CAL. INS. CODE § 
790.03(h)(14) (West 1972 & Supp. 1990). 
14. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. 
3
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insurer and that a third party claimant cannot sue both the in-
sured and the insurer in the same suit. 111 
The California Supreme Court overruled the demurrer, and 
validated the rulings of Greenberg u. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the United States16 and Shernoff u. Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County.17 These decisions held that California 
Insurance Code Section 790.0918 created a private cause of ac-
tion for a violation of the UP A and that an insurer's duty under 
the Act ran to third party claimants as well as insureds.19 Third 
party claimants could sue insurers for any violation of the 
UPA.20 
The court also analyzed Insurance Code Section 790.03(h), 
particularly the phrase, "[k]nowingly committ[ed] or per-
form[ed] with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice" and held that this section allowed for a statutory bad 
faith action against the insurer.21 The California Supreme Court 
further held that an injured claimant had an actionable claim 
against an insurer who had knowingly committed a single act of 
unfair conduct.22 
In Moradi-Shalal, the California Supreme Court granted re-
view to resolve whether an insured's liability had to be judicially 
established before a "Royal Globe action" could be brought. The 
court also used the case as a means of reviewing the viability of 
Royal Globe. 23 
The majority began by observing that there was "wide-
spread confusion" surrounding the application of Royal Globe." 
In an effort to validate its reexamination of Royal Globe, the 
majority cited Cianci u. Superior Court of Contra Costa 
15. [d. 
16. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). 
17. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975). 
18. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990). 
19. Sherno/f, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 410, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682; Greenberg, 34 Cal. 
App. 3d 994, 1000-1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475. 
20. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848. 
21. [d. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) 
(West 1972 & Supp. 1990). 
22. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849. 
23. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 758 P.2d 59-60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118. 
24. [d. 
4
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County2f> for its proposition that scholarly criticism of a decision 
justifies reexamination of prior decision, "to determine its con-
tinuing viability."28 The Cianci court actually found that reex-
amination of prior decision is proper where there exists a con-
trary United States Supreme Court decision and adverse legal 
commentary.27 The court's apparent miscasting of the Cianci 
opinion may be an indication of its eagerness to attack Moradi-
Shalal. After noting the history and exceptions to the rule of 
stare decisis, the court announced its decision to depart from 
precedent.28 
In overruling Royal Globe, the Moradi-Shalal majority 
cited numerous jurisdictions which "rejected" Royal Globe, ad-
verse commentary, and legislative history as arguments that 
Royal Globe should be overruled. 
A. REJECTION OF ROYAL GLOBE BY OTHER STATE COURTS 
The court stressed that the UP A was derived from the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Unfair 
Claims Practices Act (Model Act), adopted by 48 states.2B The 
25. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 921, 710 P.2d 375, 385, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 585 (1985). 
26. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
27. Cianci involved the reconsideration of whether the Cartwright Act (This Act is 
California's statutory antitrust provision and was codified in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 
16700 et seq.) was applicable to the medical profession. Cianci reasoned that the under-
lying decision of Willis v. Santa Ana Etc. Hospital Ass'n., 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 
26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962), should be reconsidered not only because of criticism in legal 
commentaries but because of the United States Supreme Court holding in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 173 (1975) and also because of the California Supreme 
Court decision in Marin County Board of Realtors v. Pa/sson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 
833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976). Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 921,924,710 P.2d at 385, 387, 221 Cal. 
Rptr. at 585,587. Based on these developments, inter alia, Cianci reexamined Willis and 
concluded that the Cartwright Act was applicable to the medical profession. Cianci, 40 
Cal. 3d at 924-25, 710 P.2d at 387-88, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 587. 
28. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. Ac-
cording to the majority, stare decisis is "a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior 
applicable precedent usually must be followed." This policy held true "even though the 
case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices." Stare 
decisis "is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability, and stability in the law 
are the major objectives of the legal system". Despite these "general concepts" the ma-
jority noted that stare decisis is a "flexible policy". Thus, the court said it could recon-
sider, and ultimately depart from its own prior precedent in an appropriate situation. id. 
29. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. This 
Model Act originated in 1947 after Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act which 
subjected the insurance i.ndustry to federal regulation only to the extent that it was not 
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court found it significant that seventeen of the nineteen state 
courts which considered the issue raised by Royal Globe rejected 
California's approach.30 
Interestingly, the Moradi-Shalal majority conceded that 
state statutes which have rejected a private cause of action did 
not contain precisely the same language as sections 790.03 and 
790.09.31 However, the court considered the differences 
insignificant. 32 " 
Despite acknowledging the principal that out-of-state deci-
sions were not binding on California courts the court found that 
the "near unanimity of agreement by [out-of-state] courts in 're-
jecting' Royal Globe" brought into question California's minor-
ity approach.33 
More significantly, the "rejection"of Royal Globe by out-of-
state courts is a mischaracterization. Rather than "rejecting" 
Royal Globe outright, other state courts have chosen not to fol-
low the Royal Globe analysis because of differences with Califor-
nia's statutory language. For example, Morris u. American Fam-
ily Mutual Insurance Company94 (cited by the majority as the 
"typical" approach in other jurisdictions) involved the same le-
gal issue that was decided in Royal Globe. The Morris court 
noted the "unique statutory language" in California's version of 
the UP A which served as the basis for a third party private 
cause of action against the insurer.slI However, the Morris court 
decided to dismiss the third party claimant's action by finding 
regulated by state law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). To preserve 
state regulation of insurance companies, California's legislature passed" the UP A as codi-
fied in CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10. 
30. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. "The 
courts in 17 of these 19 states have refused to recognize such a cause of action, either 
expressly rejecting the Royal Globe analysis, or interpreting statutory language similar to 
sections 790.03, subdivision (h), and 790.09 in a manner contrary to Royal Globe without 
mentioning that case." id. 
31. Moradi-Sh"alal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122. 
32. [d. " 
33. Justice Mosk's dissent unequivocally refuted the majority's "misplaced" reliance 
on other jurisdictions stating, "California courts alone have the responsibility of inter-
preting the laws adopted by the California legislature, and they cannot be deterred from 
that duty by what other states have done or failed to do under laws enacted by their 
legislative bodies". [d. at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137. 
34. 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986). 
35. [d. at 237 n.6. 
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she had no private cause of action against the insurer. The Mor-
ris court held that a private person does not have a cause of 
action against an insurer under Minnesota's UP A. 36 
In Seeman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,37 the 
Iowa Supreme Court held" ... that the legislature implicitly in-
tended the insurance commissioner's powers to be the exclusive 
means of enforcing ... " the state's UPA.38 Specifically, the 
court noted that Iowa's UPA provided that, "[nJo order of the 
commissioner under this chapter or order of a court to enforce 
the same shall in any way relieve or absolve any person affected 
by such order from any liability under any other laws of this 
state. (Emphasis added)"39 The Seeman court noted that in Cal-
ifornia, "[tJhe Royal Globe court found that the elimination of 
the word "other" from the California Act indicated that the leg-
islature intended to provide a private cause of action. "40 Thus, 
states that have eliminated the word "other" from their version 
of the UP A have found that a private cause of action may be 
brought against the insurer. 
Two general observations .may also undermine thepersua-
siveness of the out-of-state decisions cited by the Moradi-Shalal 
majority. First, several. of the jurisdictions denying a Royal 
Globe action recognize only a contractual basis for bad faith fail-
ure to settle within policy limits.·1 This is significant in that 
states that do recognize a Royal Globe action also recognize a 
tort basis for insurer bad faith. The intermediate step of tort 
liability is a prerequisite to the Royal Globe action, since the 
Royal Globe action represents an expansion of tort liability. 
Second, only eight of seventeen courts cited by Moradi-
Shalal are state Supreme Courts.42 Moreover, two state supreme 
36. Id. at 238. 
37. 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982). 
38. Id. at 42. 
39.Id. 
40. Id. citing Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846. 
41. Earth Scientists II. United States Fidelity & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (D. 
Kan. 1985); Lawton II. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 613-14, 392 A.2d 
576, 580-81; Morris, 386 N.W.2d 233, 237; Swinton II. Chubb & Son, Inc., 283 S.C. 11, 14, 
320 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. App. 1984). 
42. See White II. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986); 
Seeman II. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982); Kranzush II. Badger State 
Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wise. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981); Farris II. United States 
7
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courts recognize a Royal Globe action."s This hardly constitutes 
a unanimous number of state jurisdictions rejecting Royal 
Globe. 
B. "SCHOLARLY CRITICISM" OF ROYAL GLOBE 
The court noted seven law review articles that emphasized 
the "erroneous" nature of the holding in Royal Globe."" The 
court cited "strained interpretation" of the statutory provisions 
and the "misreading" of available legislative history as evidence 
of the erroneous nature of Royal Globe."" 
In citing these articles, the majority failed to mention that 
six articles also praised Royal Globe for protecting society from 
the unfair practices of insurers."8 Moreover, of the seven articles 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania 
Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981); Wilder v. Aetna Life & 
. Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309 (1981); Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978). 
43. Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 167 W.Va. 597, 280 S.E.2d 252, 255-58 
(1981); Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (1983). 
44. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298-99, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23; 
See Meskin, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illustration of 
the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 371 (1985); Casey, 
Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior 
Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917 (1983); Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need 
for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 843 (1982); White, Liability Insurers and 
Third Party Claimants: The Limits of Duty, 48 u. CHI. L. REV. 125, 148-51 (1981); Note, 
Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit against an 
Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1176-87 (1980); Tancredi, 
Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Com-
pany v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 777, 791-93 (1980); Van Osdel Manning, 
Liability to Third Parties for Economic Insurers: Privity as a Useful Animal, or a Blind 
Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 87, 111-18, 125-27 (1981). 
45. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The 
court listed undesireable social and economic effects of the decisions, such as multiple 
litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive settlements, excessive jury awards, and 
escalating insurance, legal and other "transaction" costs. id. 
46. See Aitken & Abeltin, When Does "The Fat Lady Sing" for Purposes of a Royal 
Globe Action? Endless Litigation over What Does or Should Constitute the Resolution 
of a Claim, 14 W. ST. U.L. REV. 55 (1986); Beck & Horwitz, Insurer's Day in Court: New 
Limits on Royal Globe, 8 L.A. LAW. 31 (1985); Lambert, Tom on Torts, 23 AM. TRIAL 
. LAW. A. L. RPTR. 338, 342-43 (1980); Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law: A 
Potential Weapon for Consumer Protection, 17 TRIAL 22 (1981); Rose, A Statutory Ac-
tion for Insurer Bad Faith - The Reasonably Clear Remedy for the Third Party Claim-
ant, 11 PAC. L.J. 945 (1980). One of the articles cited by the Moradi-Shalal majority also 
concluded that Royal Globe furthered California public policy. See also Tancredi, Ex-
8
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cited by the majority, only two claimed Royal Globe had "nega-
tive effects";" These two articles failed to support their attacks 
on Royal Globe with any factual evidence.48 
The court also relied on the 1980 Report of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (N.A.I.C.) and found 
that the report was "instructive" regarding the intent of the 
framers.49 The court failed to point out, however, that the 
N.A.I.C. is an organization of state officials who supervise the 
insurance industry and promote uniformity of legislation and 
regulation affecting insurance to protect the interests of policy-
holders.IIO Moreover, since California's legislature adopted a 
modified version of the Model Act, the intent of the Model Act's 
framers is irrelevant to interpreting California's UP A. The court 
should have considered the intent of the California legislators 
who drafted and passed the UP A. 
C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF INSURANCE CODE SECTION 790.03 
The Moradi-Shalal majority considered "additional" legis-
lative history allegedly "overlooked" by the Royal Globe court. 111 
The court examined the state's Legislative Analyst's Reportll2 
and the Legislative Counsel's Digest,IIS which both described 
Section 790.03 as calling for "administrative enforcement".114 
tending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company 
v. Superior Court, supra, note 44. 
47. Tancredi, Extending the Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe 
Insurance Company v. Superior Court, supra, note 44; Casey, Bad Faith: Defining Ap-
plicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 917, 930-39 (1983). 
48. One author delineated the problems with the Royal Globe decision, did not sup-
port his criticism of Royal Globe with factual evidence, and then concluded his article by 
proposing solutions to these problems. Casey, Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards 
in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 917, 939-44 
(1983). 
49. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The 
court said: "In the words of the 1980 N.A.I.C. report, 'The 1971 Model Act does not 
contain an individual right of action provision .. .' .. id. 
50. See 1 Encyclopedia of Associations 521-22 (M. Burek, K. Koek, and A. NovalIo, 
24th ed. 1990). 
51. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123 . 
. 52. Pierson, Analysis of Assembly Bill 459 (Apr. 28, 1972). 
53. Legislative Counsel's Digest to A.B. 459 (1972). 
54. The Insurance Commissioner may issue a cease and desist order to insurance 
companies that are in violation of California's UP A. 
9
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Since neither the Legislative Analyst nor the Legislative Counsel 
said that the new act created a private right of action, the 
Moradi-Shalal court interpreted this as a strong indication that 
the Legislature never intended to create such a right of action. Ii Ii 
This characterization by the court was misleading at best, since . 
the Royal Globe court did consider both the Report and the Di-
gest. However, the Royal Globe court found these sources to be 
too remote or too generalized to be of any use in interpreting 
Section 790.03. li8 
The Moradi-Shalal majority was also guided by "subse-
quent legislative history" Senate Bill No. 483117 which provided 
that no civil liability would be imposed on any insurer.1I8 The 
court said that the bill's intent was to overturn Royal Globe, but 
did not find that the failure of the bill to reach the Assembly 
indicated that the movement to overturn Royal Globe lacked 
support.IIS The court instead emphasized that the Senate agreed 
that Royal Globe should be abrogated.80 
Finally, the Moradi-Shalal court addressed the argument 
that the Legislature's 1983 modification of Section 790.03 with-
out changing subdivision (h) or addressing the Royal Globe issue 
was, in effect, a "silent Legislative approval" of the Royal Globe 
decision.81 
Cianci v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County 82 pro-
vided the general rule that if the Legislature fails to change a 
law in a specific area, when the "general subject" is before it and 
other changes are made, the legislative intent is to leave the law 
as it is, in the area not amended.83 The Moradi-Shalal majority 
expanded upon this general rule. The court cited Cianci for the 
proposition that "something more than mere silence should be 
required before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of 
55. Moradi·Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
56. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 887, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847. 
57. S.B. 483, Journal of the Senate, Legislature of the State of California, Reg. Sess., 
Vol. 2, 3068-71 (1979). 
58. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. 
59. Id. This bill "stalled" in the Ways and Means Committee. id. 
60.Id. 
6l. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. 
62. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985). 
63. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 923, 710 P.2d at 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 586. 
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implied legislation ... "G4 Under the majority's reasoning, in or-
der for a statute to be "upheld" the Legislature should give di-
rect approval of all provisions left intact during the process of 
statute modification. Gli 
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ROYAL GLOBE 
The court delineated the "negative impact" of Royal Globe 
by pointing out that Royal Globe promoted multiple litigation.GG 
The court found that Royal Globe encourages two lawsuits by 
the injured claimant; an initial suit against the insured, followed 
by a suit against the insurer for bad faith refusal to settle.67 
Royal Globe also tended to encourage "unwarranted" settlement 
demands by claimants and coerced inflated settlements by insur-
ers trying to avoid a bad faith action.GS However, these argu-
ments are questionable since a Royal Globe action will only be 
brought if an insurer violates any of the provisions as set forth 
in the UPA. Moreover, it is disengenous to imply that injured 
claimants will not settle in good faith with an insurer for the 
tactical advantage of a subsequent Royal Globe action. It is the 
insurer who holds the "upper hand" in settlement negotiations 
since the claimant is often in immediate need of capital to pay 
for medical costs as well as recover lost wages. 
If the injured claimant does use the original settlement as a 
"tactic" to bring a Royal Globe action and collect a "windfall" 
the insurer can point this out to the court. If the argument is 
persuasive, then the court will find for the insurer. Furthermore, 
if the court determines that the Royal Globe action was frivo-
lous, the court could award the insurer sanctions. G9 
Another feared consequence of Royal Globe was that it 
would cause insurance costs to rise since the insurer would make 
64. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at·124. 
65. As Justice Mosk put it "the majority's [reasoning] stands the concept of legisla-
tive intent on its head". Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
at 136. 
66. [d. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. 
69 .. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). Under § 128.5 
"[e]very trial court may order a party ... to pay any reasonable expenses ... incurred 
by another party as a result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous . . ." id. 
11
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greater expenditures to pay the costs of coerced settlements, ex-
cessive jury awards, and higher attorney fees. 70 However, neither 
the court nor the legal commentaries cited any factual evidence 
in support of these claims. 
The court also found that Royal Globe created a conflict of 
interest since the insurer had a direct duty to its insured as well 
as to third party claimants.71 This "conflict of interest", meant 
that the settlement process could be disrupted and the insured 
disadvantaged.72 Unfortunately, this argument ignores the well-
established practice in the insurance industry of providing inde-
pendent counsel where a potential conflict of interest is cre-
ated.73 By providing independent counsel an insurer's duty to 
both the insured and the third party claimant is preserved.74 
E. DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING THE ROYAL GLOBE DECISION 
The court observed that approximately 25 other Royal 
Globe cases were awaiting review, and that "many" had reached 
"conflicting conclusions" in the courts of appeal,711 The court 
said this evidenced "analytical difficulties" which the lower 
70. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. 
71. Id. at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125. 
72.Id. 
73. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 
371, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (1984). In Cumis, the court considered a situation where an 
insurer is required to pay for independent counsel for an insured "when the insurer pro-
vides its own counsel but reserves its right to noncoverage at a later date. [The court] 
conclude[d] under these circumstances there is a conflict of interest between the insurer 
and the insured, and therefore the insured has a right to independent counsel paid for by 
the insurer." id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1974 
& Supp. 1990). § 2860 provides, "If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty 
to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the 
part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall pro-
vide independent counsel to represent the insured ... " id. 
74. The court also asserted that Royal Globe left several unanswered questions re-
garding the practicality of actions against insurers pursuant to CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03. 
The court found that Royal Globe failed to define a "bad faith" refusal to abide by § 
790.03, specify the stage at which the insurer's duty to settle arises, discuss whether 
mutual good faith obligations are imposed on third party claimants, and failed to address 
"a host of constitutional problems such as vagueness, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right to contract." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 
125. With respect to these "unanswered questions" allegedly created by Royal Globe, the 
court did not address these questions other than simply mentioning them. By not ad-
dressing them at all, the court undermined their alleged import. 
75. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125. 
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courts were having in interpreting Royal Globe.76 
The majority' stated that one analytical problem which 
lower courts had in interpreting Royal Globe was that a third 
party claimant must wait until the "conclusion" of the action 
against the insured before suing the insurer for breach of Sec-
tion 790.03(h).77 Lower courts had difficulty in determining 
whether a settlement can constitute such a "conclusion" for a 
Royal Globe suit, or whether a prior judicial determination of 
the insurer's liability is required.78 
The Moradi-Shalal court held that settlement is an insuffi-
cient conclusion of the underlying action and ruled that there 
must be a "conclusive judicial determination" of the insured's 
liability before the third party can succeed in an action against 
the insurer under Section 790.03.79 The court recalled that in 
Royal Globe a joint lawsuit agaInst both the insured for negli-
gence and the insurer for violating its duties under Section 
790.03(h) would be improper.8o By holding that a determination 
of the insured's liability to a third party claimant was a prereq-
uisite to a recovery in a Royal Globe action, the court adopted 
the reasoning of Williams v. Transport Indemnity Company81 
and Heninger v. Foremost Insurance Company.82 
The Moradi-Shalal. court next. turned to the specific issue of 
76. Id .. 
77. Id. 
78.Id. 
79. Id. at 305-306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. 
80. Id. at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. The court stated three rea-
sons for this conclusion. First, a joint trial would violate CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 which 
provides that evidence that an alleged tortfeasor is insured is inadmissible to prove the 
insured's negligence or wrongdoing. The purpose of § 1155 is to prevent the prejudicial 
use of such evidence during an action against an insured. id. Second, a joint trial would 
hamper the defense of the insured on the issue of liability. id. Third, an injured party's 
damages resulting from an insurer's violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 709.03(h)(5) and 
(h)(14) would be best determined after the conclusion of the action by the third party 
claimant against the insured. id. 
81. 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984). In Williams, the court held that 
if the insured is not liable to the claimant, then the insurer is also not liable on the 
claipl. id. at 960, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
82. 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303' (1983). The Heninger court relied on 
Williams, concluding that CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 did not require an insurer to payor 
settle every claim presented by a third party claimant without regard to whether its 
insured is liable on the underlying claim. Heninger, 175 Cal. App. 3d 835, 221 Cal. Rptr. 
at 306. 
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defining a "concluded action" for a Royal Globe action.83 The 
court was interested in whether a settlement met this require-
ment. 84 The court noted that some courts of appeal followed 
Doser u. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company,81S Nationwide 
Insurance Company v. Superior Court,88 Williams v. Transport 
Indemnity Company,87 and Heninger v. Foremost Insurance 
Company,SS which collectively hold that a viable cause of action 
for an alleged violation of [section 790.03(h)] may not be filed 
until the twin requirements of conclusion of the dispute between 
the injured party and the insured and a final determination of 
the insured's liability are alleged.89 
The court of appeal in Moradi-Shalal departed from the. 
Nationwide analysis and instead adopted an alternative analy-
sis.90 Under this analysis the court of appeal relied upon Rodri-
quez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company91 and concluded 
that plaintiff could maintain a Section 790.03 action following a 
83. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305-306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. 
84.Id. 
85. 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 CaJ. Rptr. 115 (1980). Doser was the first opinion after 
Royal Globe to refer to "determination of liability" as a condition precedent to a CAL. 
INS. CODE § 790.03 cause of action. 
86. 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982). 
87. 157 CaJ. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984). 
88. 175 CaJ. App. 3d 830, 221 CaJ. Rptr. 303 (1985). 
89. In Doser, the court held that an insured's cause of action for bad faith of the 
insurer could not arise until the insured incurred a binding judgment in excess of the 
policy limit. Doser, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 162 CaJ. Rptr. at 119-20. 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 CaJ. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 
(1982) cited Doser. The Nationwide court held that because the judgment against the 
insured could be reversed on appeal and the case retried, Royal Globe's concerns regard· 
ing discovery and determination of damages were fully applicable. Thus, the court con· 
cluded that Royal Globe's language about determination of liability and conclusion of 
the action "could only have had reference to a final determination and conclusion, a final. 
judgment." Nationwide, 128 CaJ. App. 3d at 714, 180 CaJ. Rptr. at 466. 
After Nationwide, the court in Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co., 157 CaJ. App. 
3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984) stated that a CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 action was subject 
to a condition precedent. Liability of the insured must be finally determined prior to the 
commencement of a suit against the insurer. Williams, 157 CaJ. App. 3d at 962, 203 CaJ. 
Rptr. at 873. 
In Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 CaJ. Rptr. 303 (1985) 
the court cited Nationwide and Williams and concluded that a Royal Globe action could 
not be brought unless the twin requirements of conclusion of the dispute between the 
injured party and the insured and a final· determination of the insured's liability were 
alleged. Heninger, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 305. 
90. Moradi·Shalal, 46 CaJ. 3d at 309-310, 758 P.2d at 72, 250 CaJ. Rptr. at 130. 
91. 142 CaJ. App. 3d 46, 190 CaJ. Rptr. 705 (1983). 
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settlement and a dismissal with prejudice of the underlying 
claim.92 
The Moradi-Shalal majority found the court of appeal's re-
liance on Rodriguez to be "misplaced" since there was no admis-
sion of liability by defendant.93 The majority rejected this ap-
proach and instead adopted the reasoning of Nationwide for 
four reasons.9• 
First, allowing the claimant to sue the insurer after settling 
the underlying claim would mean the establishment of the in-
sured's liability within the Royal Globe' action itself.911 The ma-
jority was apprehensive of the evidentiary problem this would 
cause, since evidence of insurance would make up an essential 
part of the case and would have an obvious potential to 
prejudice the jury's determination of. the insured's liability.96 
92. Id. The court of appeal believed that the obvious purpose of the Royal Globe 
requirement of a "conclusion" of the underlying action was to avoid prejudicing the de-
fense of the insured in the underlying case. In addition, this requirement could be used 
to ascertain the amount of the damages, suffered by the injured plaintiff. id. This re-
quirement should not shield an errant insurer from the consequences of its tortious 
breach of its duties to an injured claimant. id. 
The Moradi-Shalal majority noted that the court of appeal s~emed confused about 
the requirements for a Royal Globe action. The court of appeal stated that "the language 
in Royal Globe 'until the liability of the insured is first determined' was not necessary to 
and did not serve the purpose of determining any of the facts or issues of that case which 
deferred the determination of the Section 790.03 action until after the conclusion of the 
underlying action." id. Later, the court of appeal demonstrated its inconsistency by stat-
ing "we must next determine whether the insured's liability has been conclusively estab-
lished". id. The court of appeal said such a determination was a prerequisite to bringing 
an unfair practice bad faith action against the insurer. id. 
In support of its holding the court of appeal relied upon Rodriguez v. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983). In Rodriguez, the court 
held that there was a proper Royal Globe action where the insured admitted liability. id. 
at 53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 709. Such an admission made a prior judgment determining' 
liability unnecessary. id. 
Rodriguez is consistent with Afuso v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. 
App. 3d 859,215 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1985) and Vega v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 
App. 3d 922, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1985). In Afuso, the court held that plaintiff met the 
minimum requirements for a Royal Globe action by pleading a settlement and release. 
Afuso, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 493. In Vega, the same court of appeal 
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the insurer on a § 790.03 claim when the claim-
ant had settled the underlying claim. Vega, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 926, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 
595. 
93. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 310, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
94. Id. at 311, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
95.Id. 
96. Id. In Royal Globe the California Supreme Court held that CAL. EVID. CODE § 
15
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A second problem would involve the difficulty in preventing 
the jury from considering the settlement as evidence that the 
insured was liable.97 The court noted that California Evidence 
Code Section 115298 prohibited the admission of such evidence 
to prove the settling party's liability on the settled claim.99 
Third, establishing the insured's actual liability after settle-
ment would involve litigation of the very issue that the insured 
and the insurer attempted to avoid litigating. loo By allowing a 
post settlement Royal Globe suit, the third party claimant would 
obtain a windfall. lol Because of the potential windfall to the in-
jured party, the court was suspicious that the insurer might not 
discharge its duties to the insured in an impartial manner.102 
Finally, the majority reasoned that a settlement combined 
with a dismissal with prejudice legally precluded litigating the 
liability of the insured. lOS In effect, a settlement served the pur-
pose of a final conclusion as to the underlying action for liability 
and damage claims. 104 
A fair reading of the Royal Globe opinion could show that 
the Royal Globe majority did not necessarily require a final judi-
cial determination of the underlying action between the insured 
and the third party claimant as a condition precedent for a third 
1155 prohibits a third party claimant from suing both the insurer (under CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 790.03) and the insured (on the underlying claim) in the same lawsuit. § 1155 prohibits 
the introduction of evidence that a person was insured for the harm caused. Such evi-
dence could not be used to prove negligence or other wrongdoing. 
97. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (WEST 1966 & SUPP. 1990). 
99. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132. See 
also Zalta v. Billips, 81 Cal. App. 3d 183, 190, 144 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978). 
100. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132; the 
court believed that allowing for post settlement litigation would penalize the insurer for 
choosing to settle a claim by subjecting the insurer to subsequent litigation on the liabil-
ity issue already settled. 
101. Id. A third party plaintiff could settle and retain the benefits of the settlement. 
He could then sue the insurer for additional compensation if the insurer failed to award 
an adequate settlement on the underlying claim. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 311-12,758 P.2d at 74,250 Cal. Rptr. at 132; See Dalta v. Staub, 173 Cal. 
App. 2d 613, 621, 343 P.2d 977 (1959); Rodriguez, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 54, 190 Cal. Rptr. 
705; A.J. Industries, Inc. v. Ver Halen, 75 Cal. App. 3d 751, 759, 142 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 
(1977); County of Los Angeles v. Law Building Corp., 254 Cal. App. 2d 848, 853-55, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 542 (1967). 
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party to sue the insurer. 1011 When the Royal Globe majority 
stated that a third party action could be brought once "liability 
of the insured is first determined",I°6 it was not eliciting addi-
tional conditions for filing the action. Arguably, under Royal 
Globe, a third party action against an insurer could first be filed 
when the action between the insured and the third party was 
"concluded".l07 Trial between the third party and the insurer 
could not commence until the liability of the insured was first 
determined. lOB This rationale is supported by Rodriguez v. Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Company,I°9 Afuso v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty CompanY,110 and Vega v. Western Employ-
ers Insuran.ce Company.lll 
Furthermore, the Rodriguez court articulated a more com-
pelling policy than elicited by Moradi-Shalal for not requiring a 
final judgment as a prerequisite to a Royal Globe action. Rodri-
guez recognized the "possibility of abuse by insurance compa-
nies who might entice a settlement by unfair practices, then seek 
to hide behind the cloak of that settlement. "112 
Most importantly, the California Supreme Court said in 
Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group,llS "the more plausible inter-
pretation of [section 790.03], subdivision (h)(5) is that the provi-
sion was intended to apply only to prejudgment conduct. "114 
This focus on the insurer's prejudgment conduct together with 
Royal Globe's goal of prohibiting unfair practices and encourag-
ing good faith settlementsllll logically points to the conclusion 
that no prior judgment against the insured ought to be required 
of an injured claimant as a condition precedent for a Royal 
Globe suit. 
105. Royal Globe, 2~ Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. 
106. [d. at 891-92, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 55, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705, 710 (1983). 
110. 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 863, 215 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1985). 
111. 170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 926, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1985). 
112. Rodriguez, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 711. 
113. 41 Cal. 3d 782, 718. P.2d 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). 
114. Coleman, 41 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 718 P.2d at 85,226 Cal. Rptr. at 98. 
115. Abeltin & Aitken, supra, note 46. 
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F. RETROACTIVITY OF THE MORADI-SHALAL DECISION 
In overruling Royal Globe, the Moradi-Shalal majority said 
its decision would not apply retrospectively.116 As to all Royal 
Globe actions filed before Moradi-Shalal, the court required a 
prior determination of liability.ll7 
III. THE DISSENT 
Justice Mosk stated that the issues on review had not been 
addressed,118 and that the court chose to eliminate plaintiff's 
cause of action entirely.119 Mosk declared that an objective read-
ing of Section 790.03 to be prima facie evidence that the legisla-
ture intended the statute to provide redress for insureds as well 
as third party claimants.12o He noted that a violation of the UP A 
took place even where only a single deceptive act could be 
proved,121 and section 790.03(h) created two methods by which 
the prohibited acts may be shown. 122 . 
Justice Mosk did not believe that the majority's warning to 
the insurance industry not to commit the unfair practices pro-
hibited by the Insurance Code woul<,l be a significant deterrent 
to unfair practices.123 Mosk further stated that "in 29 years 
there did not exist a single case where the Insurance Commis-
sioner has disciplined an insurance carrier for violations of the 
insurance code. "124 
116. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. 
117. [d. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
118. [d. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
119. Id. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
120. Id. at 314-16, 758 P.2d at 75-76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 
121. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 76-77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135; a 
violation of the subdivision occurs if the prohibited acts are knowingly committed on one 
occasion or if knowledge cannot be established, then it will suffice if the acts are per-
formed with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice. See Sherwood & 
Packer, Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7 PAC. L.J. 237, 484 (1976). 
122. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Mosk 
believed that statutory language regarding repetition of misconduct may be relevant to 
the Insurance Commissioner to issue a cease and desist order but such language is irrele-
vant to an aggrieved private litigant who can show that the insurer acted deliberately. 
See Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 653, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979). 
123. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316-17, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
124. Id. at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
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Mosk then turned to the Legislature's failure to enact bills 
that would have overruled Royal Globe.l211 Mosk believed this 
failure represented an affirmative legislative approval of Royal 
Globe. 128 Moreover, in 1983 the Legislature amended section 
790.03 without addressing or changing subdivision (h) or the 
Royal Globe decision.127 Mosk believed that such non-action by 
the Legislature indicated an intent to leave the law 
undisturbed.128 
Mosk refuted the majority's argument that Royal Globe was 
an "aberration" in that he found previous cases held that the 
Insurance Code authorized action by claimants and not exclu-
sively by the state's administrative agency.129 Mosk noted 
Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company130 where 
the court stated that "[t]he decision in Royal Globe was thus 
merely a change in remedy of enforcing the duty of an in-
surer."131 Moreover, contrary to the majority's findings Mosk 
125. ·Id. at 317·18, 758 P.2d 77·78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135·36. The first such bill was 
Senate Bill No. 483 (1979 Reg. Sess.). This bill passed the Senate and was referred to the 
Assembly. Ultimately, the bill "died" in the Assembly. id. 
126. Moradi·Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136, citing 
People u. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393, 396 (1954). 
127. MO'radi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136. 
128. Id. See Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 754, 758 (1975); Bailey u. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 977-78 n.10, 568 P.2d 
394, 398 n.10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669, 673 n.10 (1977); People u. Olsen, 36 Cal. 3d 638, 647 
n.19, 685 P.2d 52, 57 n.19, 205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 n.19 (1984). 
129. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318-19, 758 P.2d at 78-79,250 Cal. Rptr. at 136-
37; The first case was Greenberg u. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 34 Cal. App. 3d 
994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). In Greenberg, the court held that "Section 790.09 thus 
contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental action 
against the insurer for violation of the Insurance Code. The fair construction is that the 
person to whom civil liability runs may enforce [the statute] by an appropriate action." 
Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The Greenberg court stated 
that any other construction would overturn Crisci u. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) by implication. id. at 1001 n.5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475 
n.5. 
Second, in Shernoff u. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 
(1975) the court said that the Insurance Commissioner's disciplinary authority is limited 
to restrain against future illegal conduct. The court relied on § 790.09 which clearly 
states that no cease and desist order absolves a person from civii liability. id. at 409, 118 
Cal. Rptr. at 682. 
The third case was Homestead Supplies, Inc. u. Executiue Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. 
App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978). In Homestead, the court held that the Insurance 
Code is directed at insurers, not insureds. In fact, one of the statutory purposes is to 
protect the public. id. at 992, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 30. 
130. 146 Cal. App. 3d 926, 194 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983). 
131. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137, citing 
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found that courts of appeal did not have difficulty in applying 
Royal Globe. ls2 
Justice Mosk concluded in his dissent that by overruling 
Royal Globe the Moradi-Shalal majority was also overruling by 
implication Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United States/ss Shernoff v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County/s" and Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life In-
surance Company.ISII 
IV. THE EFFECT OF MORADI-SHALAL AND A THIRD 
PARTY CLAIMANT'S ALTERNATIVES TO A ROYAL 
GLOBE ACTION 
The Moradi-Shalal decision eliminated a third party bad 
faith action against the insurer based upon the California Insur-
ance Code and restored the bad faith principles that prevailed 
prior to Royal Globe. ls6 
A. THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH ACTIONS BY ASSIGNMENT 
As a result of the Moradi-Shalal decision, bad faith actions 
may still be maintained by the insured against the insurer for 
breach of the good faith covenant that is implied in all insurance 
contracts. However, the third party claimant cannot assert a 
cause of action for an alleged breach of the implied covenant 
since the covenant arises from the insurance contract to which 
the claimant is not a party.137 
Schlauch, 146 Cal. App. 3d at 934, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 663. 
132. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982); 
Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985); Sych v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 173 Cal. App. 3d 321, 220 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1985); Vega 
v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1985); Afuso v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 215 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1985); 
Smith v. Interinsurance Exchange, 167 Cal. App. 3d 301, 213 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1985); 
Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984); 
Trujillo v. Yosemite-Great Falls Ins. Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 26, 200 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1984); 
Rodriquez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983). 
133. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). 
134. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975). 
135. 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978). 
136. L.A. Daily J. Rpt., Nov. 18, 1988, at 12, col. 2. 
137. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588,132 Cal. 
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Despite the Moradi-Shcilal decision, it should be noted that 
an insured's claim for economic damages resulting from a breach 
of the implied covenant is assignable to a third party. Under 
such an assignment, a third party can maintain a bad faith ac-
tion against the liability insurer.138 
B. THE UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUTE: A NEW STATUTORY BASIS 
FOR A THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT TO SUE AN INSURER FOR BAD FAITH 
In the 1988 general election, Californians passed Proposi-
tion 103 and California Insurance Code Section 1861.03(a) to 
offset the victory for the insurance industry, inter alia, in 
Moradi-Shalal. 139 The new law provides that insurance compa-
nies will be subject to the state laws governing unfair competi-
tion in trade practices, civil rights, and state antitrust laws and 
that the insurance industry shall now be subject to the iaws ap-
plicable to any business.Ho Since California Insurance Code Sec-
tion 790.03 applies exclusively to the "business of insurance", it 
seems improbable that the quoted language could reasonably be 
interpreted to resurrect a private Royal Globe cause of action.H1 
Proposition 103 also makes insurers expressly subject to the 
numerous and complex provisions of the· state's unfair business 
practices laws.142 The purpose of the unfair business trade prac-
tice statutes is to "safeguard the public against the creation or 
perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage compe-
tition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, 
fraudulent, and discriminatory practices by which fair and hon-
est competition is destroyed or prevented.1Il43 California courts 
interpret "unfair competition" to mean any unfair business 
Rptr. 424, 428 (1976). 
138. Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 3d 220, 241, 636 P. 2d 32, 45, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 343, 356 (1981); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 801, 41 Cal. 
Rptr. 401, 408-409 (1964). 
139. See California Ballot Pamphlet, analysis of Prop. 103 by Legislative Analyst, as 
presented to voters, Gen. Elec., Nov. 8, 1988, at 98, 140. 
140. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990). 
141. L.A. Daily J. Rpt., Dec. 16, 1988, at 10, col. 1. Proposition 100, which would 
have explicitly revived private Royal Globe claims, was defeated at the polls. id. 
142. Parts 2 and 3, commencing with CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 16600, Div. 7 (West 
1987 & Supp. 1990). 
143. CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 17001 (West 1987). 
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practice prohibited by law.144 
Recently, in Beatty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company14l'> the California Court of Appeal interpreted 
the state's prohibition on unfair competition to include unfair 
business practices by the insurance industry. In Beatty, the 
court of appeal held that California Business and Professions 
Code Section 17200 et seq. could serve as a proper basis for rem-
edying the unfair practices of insurers.148 The court noted that 
the adoption of the unfair competition statute by the Legisla-
ture reflected an expansion of common-law notions of unfair 
competition. "[T]he Legislature, by adopting [Civil Code] 
[S]ection 3369, broadened the scope of legal protection against 
wrongful business practices generally, and in so doing extended 
to the entire consuming public the protection once afforded only 
to business competitors."147 
The court pointed out that this ruling was not in conflict 
with Moradi-Shalal since that decision merely eliminated a pri-
vate cause of action pursuant to Insurance Code Section 
790.03.148 In fact, Moradi-Shalal recognized the continued valid-
ity of "administrative remedies" and "appropriate common law 
actions" against insurers. l49 
Section 17200 et seq. has long been interpreted as a con-
sumer protection statute.lIIO Its purpose was to ferret out unfair 
business practices wherever they might occur and in whatever 
guise human ingenuity can devise. llli Moreover, the statute's 
standing provision, section 17204 also evinces the Legislature's 
intention that the statute be applicable to all businesses includ-
ing the insurance industry.11l2 
144. People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979). 
145. 213 Cal. App. 3d 379, 262 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1989). 
146. Id. at 385, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 83. 
147. Beatty, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82, citing Barquis v. 
Merchants Collection Ass'n., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 109,496 P.2d 817, 827-28, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 
755-56 (1972). Until 1977, the Unfair Competition Statute was located in CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3369, at which time it was substantially re-enacted in its present form and location in 
the Business and Professions Code. 
148. Beatty, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 86. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 383, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 81. 
151. Id. at 387, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 84. 
152. Id. at 384, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 82. 
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As stated in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association,lISs 
"[s]ection [17200 et seq.] demonstrates a clear design to protect 
consumers as well as. . . any member of the public to sue on his 
own behalf or on behalf of the public generally. If the legislat.ure 
had been solely concerned with protection against . . . unfair 
competitive advantage, it would certainly have more narrowly 
circumscribed the class of persons permitted to institute such 
actions."u4 Despite this new theory under which third party 
claimants can sue an insurer for unfair practices it must be 
pointed out that Section 17200 et seq. contains no provision for 
damages for violation of any of its provisions. Section 17200 et 
seq. merely provides a third party claimant with injunctive relief 
as a remedy for an insurer's bad faith acts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, it appears that the insurance industry 
achieved a great victory when the California Supreme Court 
overruled Royal Globe. The benefits, however, may be short-
lived. 
The reasoning utilized by the Moradi-Shalal majority con-
tains the seeds for its own destruction. To arrive at its proffered 
result, the California Supreme Court bent the principle of. stare 
decisis to such an extreme that in its present "watered-down" 
form, the Moradi-Shalal decision, itself could conceivably be 
swept away in the same manner as Royal Globe. Under Moradi-
Shalal's analysis any prior court decision may be "properly" re-
considered and overruled where there exists contrary out-of-
state decisions and legal commentary critical of the underlying 
court decision. 
In addition, state legislative action or a public referendum 
that is more comprehensive than Proposition 103, could create a 
new statutory basis for a Royal Globe action. In the alternative, 
legislative action or a public referendum could also be used. to 
add some "teeth" (by providing a damages provision) to the 
cause of action available to third party claimants under Califor-
153. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 406 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). 
154. Barquis, 7 Cal. 3d at 110-11 n.11, 496 P.2d 828-29 n.11, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57 
n.ll. 
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nia's Unfair Competition Statute. Only in this way can a third 
party claimant be given protection from the insurer's potential 
unfair practices. 
Randolph Stevenson Hom* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991. 
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